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Abstract
These notes show the tools in Le Treust and Tomala (2017) extend to the
case of multiple inequality and equality constraints. This showcases the power
of the results in that paper to analyze problems of information design subject
to constraints. In fact, we show in Doval and Skreta (2018) that they can be
used to provide an upper bound on the number of posteriors a designer with
limited commitment uses in his optimal mechanism.
∗The notes are currently in flux and will be updated soon to show how these tools can shed light
on some results in the literature and open the door to analyzing new and exciting problems.
†California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125. E-mail: ldoval@caltech.edu
‡University of Texas at Austin, University College London, and CEPR. E-mail:
vskreta@gmail.com. Vasiliki Skreta acknowledges funding by the European Research Council
(ERC) consolidator grant “Frontiers In Design.” Other acknowledgements to be added.
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1 Introduction
In Doval and Skreta (2018) we establish a canonical class of mechanisms for lim-
ited commitment. Relying on this canonical class, we show how to characterize the
principal’s optimal mechanism by solving a constrained information design problem.
The results here provide tools to solve such general constrained information design
problems. These problems are becoming common: Since Kamenica and Gentzkow
(2011) seminal paper on Bayesian persuasion, the literature on information design
has grown steadily. A bulk of new work analyzes constrained information design
problems, which can be classified in three groups
1. The information designer faces constraints additional to the Bayes’ plausibil-
ity constraint in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), like in Boleslavsky and Kim
(2018) on persuasion and moral hazard, and Le Treust and Tomala (2017)) on
information transmission with capacity constraints.
2. The information designer is designing a mechanism that satisfies incentive
and participation constraints, like in Dworczak (2017) work on aftermarkets,
Georgiadis and Szentes (2018) work on optimal monitoring in moral hazard,
and in our own work Doval and Skreta (2018) canonical for limited commit-
ment.
3. Mechanism design problems that do not involve information design and still
can be solved using information design tools, like Dworczak et al. (2018).
The typical approach to tackle these constrained information design problems is
to set up a Lagrangian to incorporate the constraints into the objective function,
except for the Bayes’ plausibility constraint. If each constraint can be written as
the expectation over posteriors of some function, then the Lagrangian itself can
be written as an expectation over posteriors of some function given the Lagrange
multiplier. If there are N possible states of the world, one may be tempted to apply
Carathe´odory’s theorem and conclude from this that the optimal information policy
uses at most N posteriors. After all, the solution to the problem would correspond
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to the concavification of the function whose expectation over posteriors determines
the Lagrangian.
In an inspiring contribution, Le Treust and Tomala (2017) show that the above
reasoning is flawed when the information designer faces one inequality constraint. At
the heart of their result is the observation that the Lagrange multiplier is also part
of the solution to the optimization problem. Indeed, they show that the solution
corresponds to concavifying a function of N + 1 variables: the first N correspond to
a belief and the last corresponds to the inequality constraint. It follows then that
the optimal policy may involve N + 1 posteriors. The authors also show that the
Lagrangian approach is valid for their problem.
In Doval and Skreta (2018), the designer designs both an allocation rule and an
information structure; both have to satisfy the agent’s participation and incentive
compatibility constraints. To show the upper bound on the number of posteriors
that the designer uses in an optimal policy, we apply the extension of the results
Le Treust and Tomala (2017) which we present in these notes. It is our hope that
given the prevalence of constrained information design this simple extension is useful
to other researchers.
2 Setting
Consider the following problem.1 Let Ω be a finite set of states. Let f, g1, . . . , gr, gr+1, . . . , gK :
∆(Ω) 7→ R ∪ {−∞} be a tuple of functions defined on ∆(Ω). For µ ∈ ∆(Ω) and
γ1, . . . , γK ∈ R, consider
cavg1,...,gKf(µ, γ1, . . . , γK) := sup


∑
m
λmf(µm) :
∑
m λmµm = µ,∑
m
λmgl(µm) ≥ γl, l ∈ {1, . . . , r},∑
m λmgl(µm) = γl, l ∈ {r + 1, . . . , K}

 .
(1)
1To make the comparison with Le Treust and Tomala (2017) simple, we follow their notation
as much as possible. However, while they present their results for any convex set X , to make the
presentation closer to information design, we let X be the space of beliefs over the set of states Ω.
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Le Treust and Tomala (2017) consider the above problem for r = 1 and no equality
constraints.
3 Result
Proposition 3.1. Define f g1,...,gK : ∆(Ω)× RK 7→ R ∪ {−∞}
f g1,...,gK(µ, γ1, . . . , γK) =
{
f(µ) if γi ≤ gi(µ), i ∈ {1, . . . , r} ∧ γi = gi(µ), i ∈ {r + 1, . . . , K}
−∞ otherwise
.
Then, for each (µ, γ1, . . . , γK) ∈ ∆(Ω)× R
K,
cavg1,...,gKf(µ, γ1, . . . , γK) = cavf
g1,...,gK(µ, γ1, . . . , γK).
Proof. The function cav f g1,...,gK(µ, γ1, . . . , γK) is given by the following program:
sup
∑
m
λmf
g1,...,gK(µm, γ1,m, . . . , γK,m)
s.t.
{ ∑
m λmµm = µ∑
m λmγl,m = γl, l ∈ {1, . . . , K}
.
Take a family (λm, µm, γ1,m, . . . , γK,m) that is feasible for this program. Then, for
l ≤ r, we have
∑
λmgl(µm) ≥
∑
m
λmγl,m = γm, and for l ∈ {r + 1, . . . , K}, we
have
∑
λmgl(µm)
∑
m λmγl,m = γm. Thus, (λm, µm, γ1,m, . . . , γK,m) is feasible for
cav g1,...,gKf(µ, γ1, . . . , γK). Thus, cavg1,...,gKf(µ, γ1, . . . , γK) ≥ cavf
g1,...,gK(µ, γ1, . . . , γK).
On the other hand, let (λm, µm) such that
∑
m λmµm = µ and
∑
λmgl(µm) ≥
γl, l ≤ r and
∑
m λmgl(µm) = γl, l ∈ {r+1, . . . , K}. For each l, let γl =
∑
m λmgl(xm)
and for each m, let γl,m = gl(µm) + γl − γl. Then,
∑
m λmγl,m = γl. Because
γl ≥ γl (with equality for l ∈ {r + 1, . . . , K}), gl(µm) ≥ γl,m for l ∈ {1, . . . , r} and
gl(xm) = γl,m for l ∈ {r + 1, . . . , K}. Thus, (λm, µm, γ1,m, . . . , γK,m) is feasible for
cavf g1,...,gK . Hence, cavg1,...,gKf(µ, γ1, . . . , γK) ≤ cavf
g1,...,gK(µ, γ1, . . . , γK).
Corollary 3.1. The solution to problem (1) uses at most N +K posteriors.
4
Proof. The result follows from Proposition 3.1 and an application of Caratheo´dory’s
theorem (see, e.g., Rockafellar (1970)), because f g1,...,gK has domain ∆(Ω)×RK .
Corollary 3.2. Suppose that in problem (1), onlyM < r inequality constraints bind.
Then the solution to problem (1) uses at most N +M +K − r posteriors.
Proof. Suppose that in the solution to program cavg1,...,gKf(µ, γ1, . . . , γK), M ≤ r
constraints bind and r −M are slack. Then
cavg1,...,gKf(µ, γ1, . . . , γK) = cavgM ,gr+1,...,gKf(µ, γM , γr+1, . . . , γK),
where γM is the projection of vector (γ1, . . . , γr) on the binding constraints and gM is
the projection of vector (g1, . . . , gr) on the setM . It follows from Proposition 3.1 that
cavgM ,gr+1,...,gKf(µ, γM , γr+1, . . . , γK) = cav f
gM ,gr+1,...,gK(µ, γM , . . . , γr+1, . . . , γK). Thus
the solution to (1) uses at most N +M +K − r beliefs.
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